

watch 1329

SD 31921-105

CONFIDENTIAL
TOP SECRET**WATCH COMMITTEE**
of the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE**Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions****TOP SECRET**

Document No.

No Change in Class. ☐☐ DeclassifiedClass. Changed to: TS S *1989*

Next Review Date:

Auth.: HQ 70-3

Date: *2/27/79*From: 4 July 1951
To : 11 July 1951
Washington 25, D. C.
12 July 1951

25X1

No. 49

SUMMARY OF INDICATIONS DURING PERIOD

1. **KOREA:** The propaganda and attitude of the Communists at the cease-fire conference provide no indication that they have modified their previous stand on a Korean settlement or that they are prepared to make concessions. The Communist demand for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the Communists' failure to mention guarantees are consistent with their propaganda statements that they consider themselves the victors and that their objective is to secure the withdrawal of UN forces. Enemy ground activity, including substantial southbound vehicular traffic, indicates that preparations for an offensive continue although it does not appear imminent. Reports of the training of North Korean troops in Manchuria and of the possible formation of new NKA corps suggest that the build-up of North Korean forces is intended to prepare them ultimately to take over from the CCP, but reports meanwhile indicate that a substantial flow of Chinese Communist reinforcements to Korea continues. The entry of 80,000 new "volunteers" and possibly a new CCP Army group has been reported. A sudden resumption of large-scale enemy air operations coincided with preliminary cease-fire negotiations and included the appearance of a considerable number of Type 15 jets, suggesting an increasingly aggressive attitude which would be in keeping with continued enemy ground force build-up during the cease-fire discussions. A cease-fire without guarantees against enemy occupation of forward airfields could greatly enhance Communist air capabilities against UN forces. Several unconfirmed reports of Sino-Soviet conferences in Peiping have stated that the cease-fire was intended to gain time for further Communist military preparations and that action, possibly in the late summer, may be directed against Formosa, Japan, or Indochina, as well as Korea.
2. **JAPAN:** Increasing Soviet propaganda emphasis on the Japanese peace treaty further suggests that the USSR may press this issue in the near future and that one objective of the cease-fire proposal may have been to inject the Japanese question into subsequent discussions.

USAF & DIA REVIEWS COMPLETED

TOP SECRET

CC000083

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP SECRET

3. **CHINA:** Although there are no indications of substantial military preparations for operations against Formosa, there has been a continuing flow of materiel into South China and the Chinese have linked their popular drive to purchase military equipment with the "liberation of Formosa." There are continuing reports of an increase in CCAF training activity in South and Central China, including combined fighter and bomber air-ground training in the Shanghai area and heavy training activity in the Canton area.
4. **INDOCHINA:** Although the reported movement of two Viet Minh divisions into Annam now appears erroneous, the expected rearming of Viet Minh regiments in this area suggests that an increase in Viet Minh activity in Annam is to be expected. A report that the Viet Minh 308th Division is to be rearmed from China, that Chinese truck companies have been organized to supply the Viet Minh, and that the rail line to the Indochina border is to be completed by the end of July provide further evidence of continuing Chinese support of the Viet Minh. There is, however, no acceptable evidence that a Chinese Communist invasion is imminent or that CCF units as such are now operating in Indochina.
5. **GERMANY-AUSTRIA:** There are no indications of significant changes in the training or disposition of Soviet forces in Germany. Reports indicate that the recent influx of Soviet troops into Germany has exceeded departures by about 50,000 and that some 10,000 new troops have arrived in Austria and Hungary, but in view of further expected releases it is too early to assess the overall effect on troop strength. Known rail preparations for the World Youth Festival in Berlin during August provide no indication to date that the assembly of rolling stock to move participants is a cover for a possible troop movement.
6. **SATELLITES:** The reliable identification of MIG-15's in the Polish Air Force and reports of the training of Rumanian air personnel in jet fighters is further evidence of the supply of Soviet jet aircraft, including the first-line MIG-15, to the Satellites. An advance in call-ups to the Czech Army has resulted in an estimated 20,000 increase in strength to 155,000, and unconfirmed reports from Rumania indicate that a two-class call-up may be under way there. Evacuations along the Rumanian border adjacent to Yugoslavia apparently continue and the planned evacuation of Rumanians as well as minority groups has been reported.
7. **IRAN:** Reports that Soviet troops along the Iranian border have been reinforced are not substantiated. The Communist Tudeh Party is becoming increasingly active in demonstrations.
8. **USSR:** The Air Show in Moscow on 8 July was marked by an impressive display of new type aircraft including the prototypes of four new jet fighters and a new long-range bomber tentatively considered to

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

be a heavy bomber. There were also indications that jet aircraft are possibly being developed for the Naval Air Force. The Air Show indicated that the Soviets are making further progress in aircraft development and that they are developing a variety of types of aircraft.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Soviet Armed Forces in being are in an advanced state of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. Military and political indications are that the Communists intend to insist upon a solution of controversial problems strictly along lines which further Communist world objectives. There are no indications that the Soviets and their Communist allies, in pursuing their major objectives, intend necessarily to avoid future actions which might precipitate global hostilities.
2. Political developments provide no indication of a modification of Communist demands for a Korean settlement, and military preparations continue to point to a Communist intention to resume hostilities if they fail to secure their previously announced objectives by political means.
3. There are no firm indications of Communist preparations for major military operations in the Far East outside the Korean theater in the immediate future, but substantial Chinese Communist support of the Viet Minh continues.
4. Available intelligence does not indicate Soviet intentions to initiate hostilities in Europe or the Near East in the immediate future. There are, however, continuing military and political indications of Soviet and Satellite preparations for war. Satellite ground and air capabilities continue steadily to increase and further progress in Soviet aircraft development is evident.

TOP SECRET

ANALYSIS OF INDICATIONS

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. KOREA

- (1) Cease-fire Discussions. The Communists' propaganda and their announced proposals at the cease-fire discussions have provided no indication that the Communists have modified their previous stand on a Korean settlement or that they are prepared to make concessions. The Communist terms, as announced by the Peiping radio on 11 July, included three points: the simultaneous cessation of all military action; the establishment of a military demarcation line along the 38th Parallel and the withdrawal of all troops from a ten-kilometer zone on either side of this line; and the withdrawal of all foreign troops "in the shortest possible time." It is noteworthy that the Communist proposals not only made no mention of guarantees for the enforcement of the armistice but also that they assume that the withdrawal of foreign troops is a military and not a political question. Although it is possible that the Communists, in initial discussions, are making demands which they intend later to modify, the whole tone of their propaganda during the week portrayed the Communists as victors and indicated that their objective in the discussions was the withdrawal of UN forces. Broadcasts from both Pyongyang and Peiping asserted in effect that the United States was being forced to sue for peace as the result of her military failure in Korea and Sino-Korean invincibility. The Moscow radio on 5 July quoted a North Korean newspaper article to the effect that the withdrawal of foreign troops and the cessation of armed intervention by the U.S. in Korea would provide the necessary conditions for the settlement of the Korean question and the establishment of peace in the Far East. There were also suggestions that the Communists intend again to raise the question of Formosa and the admission of Communist China to the UN in subsequent discussions. A cable transmitted to the UN by the North Korean Foreign Office on 7 July set forth a purported appeal of American and British PW's calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, the conclusion of a Five-Power peace pact, the exposure of U.S. atrocities in Korea, the withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Formosa, and the admission of Communist China to the UN. Despite a marked increase in cordiality by Soviet diplomats during the week, and the statements of at least two Soviet officials that "peace" is to be achieved, Soviet-Communist propaganda and actions provided no evidence of a change in their objectives in Korea or a genuine desire to lessen world tensions.

TOP SECRET

(2) Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400230012-1
Ground. Enemy activity in Korea continues to indicate that preparations are under way for a resumption of the offensive while reports from several sources indicate that the build-up of North Korean and Chinese Communist military strength is also continuing. The volume of southbound enemy vehicular traffic is approaching that which has preceded previous offensives, and a field estimate states that purely tactical considerations suggest the period of 15-25 July as the most likely for the resumption of the enemy offensive. Should the present negotiations be protracted the most likely period for the resumption of offensive operations would be later, possibly as late as mid-August. In general, however, there has been a lessening of enemy activity in forward areas of the type which in the past has indicated an imminent offensive. One or two PW's have stated "the new offensive" is to begin on or about 28 July, while some other reports have suggested its postponement until August. Although the information is not fully substantiated, reports of the past several weeks have indicated that substantial numbers of North Korean troops are still being trained in Manchuria, and unconfirmed reports have mentioned the formation of two new North Korean corps and a new tank division equipped with 300 T-34 tanks. The number of Soviet advisers with North Korean units reportedly has also increased, with units larger than battalions now said to have at least six Soviet officers as "advisors." Although these reports suggest that the North Korean Army is being built up to take over from the Chinese Communists, and at least one report has stated that North Korean forces will eventually displace the CCF, there are also continuing indications of the flow of Chinese Communist reinforcements to Korea. According to a recent report, the commanders of the Third and Fourth Field Army logistical commands informed General Peng Teh-huai on 30 June that a total of 80,000 new "volunteers" had been dispatched to the Korean front.

25X1

25X1

Other reports of the continuing movement of Chinese Communist troops towards or into Korea include the statements of PW's that the 15th Army Group of the Fourth Field Army is to participate in the next offensive, reports of the presence in Korea of uncommitted elements of the First Field Army, and a report that 120,000 troops from the First, Second and Third Field Armies were to be moved to the northeast border of China before the end of May. The entrance of Soviet troops into Korea and their presence in Manchuria continues to be reported. One PW recently has claimed to have seen some 200 T-34 tanks in Manchuria operated by Soviet troops. There is still no confirmation of the presence of Soviet troops, other than advisers and AAA personnel, in either Manchuria or Korea.

(3) Air. Following a period of relative inactivity early in the week (which was characterized by generally bad weather), enemy jet fighters resumed operations on a considerable scale. Approximately 50 MIG-15's were encountered on 7 July in the Sinuiju area; 75-80 MIG-15's and 20 aircraft described as Type 15's (high-wing, swept-wing jet fighters) were encountered on 8 July in the Pyongyang and Sinuiju area; and 4-8 MIG-15's were encountered on 9 July in the Sinanju area. Although the enemy lost 5 MIG's and had 4 others damaged, without damaging UN aircraft, he was aggressive and his flying technique was described as generally excellent. The engagement near Pyongyang was the fourth time in two weeks that enemy jets had attacked UN aircraft in that area. The sudden resumption of large-scale enemy jet counter-air operations coinciding with preliminary cease-fire negotiations could be designed to impress the UN that the enemy is negotiating from a position of strength. It is also possible that the enemy is utilizing this period of negotiations to commit the maximum number of pilots for training and experience, a possibility which is strengthened by the apparent employment of Type 15 jets for the first time in considerable numbers. According to a FEAF estimate, a period of less than 30 days would probably be sufficient to rehabilitate airfields in North Korea and would permit the accommodation of a major portion of aircraft now in Manchuria. A cease-fire without guarantees against such activity could thus greatly enhance enemy capabilities for both defensive and offensive air activity against UN forces.

(4) Reported Communist Intentions. Since the Malik cease-fire proposal of 23 June a number of reports have been received purporting to set forth the results of various high-level Sino-Soviet conferences in Peiping. None of these reports has been substantiated and the details of the alleged decisions have shown considerable variation. In general, however, and despite the numerous discrepancies, these reports have fairly consistently stated that a primary objective of the cease-fire proposal was to gain time for further Communist military preparations not only in Korea but also possibly for action against other targets, including Formosa, Japan, and Indochina. Various reports have alleged that if cease-fire discussions break down, the "International Volunteer Army" will move into Korea. At least two reports have stated that a major effort is to be devoted to preventing the signing of the Japanese peace treaty and that if this fails an attack on Japan is to be launched. A mid-August date has been mentioned for a Chinese Communist attack on Formosa.

While various reports continue to allege that Communist military preparations are being timed for some further military action in late summer. One interesting feature of several reports has been the clear suggestion

~~TOP SECRET~~

that the cease-fire proposal was the result of prior Sino-Soviet conferences and that Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chou En-lai possibly made a trip to Moscow during June. In contrast to most of the information, there has been one report that the Soviet Government is definitely seeking peace in Korea and is even withholding military supplies and that the Chinese Communists, disturbed by their heavy losses, are also anxious to bring hostilities to a close.

b. JAPAN. The Moscow radio within the past week devoted considerable attention to the proposed Japanese peace treaty, thus further suggesting that the USSR intends to press the question in the near future and to follow up a Korean cease-fire with agitation for the inclusion of the Soviet Union and Communist China in Japanese peace treaty discussions. Soviet emphasis on this question continues to suggest that the USSR regards the Japanese issue as the most important in the Far East and that one objective of the cease-fire proposal may have been to inject Japan into the discussions with the objective of postponing the treaty. The proposal for a Five-Power Pact in the Far East continues to be a favored theme in Communist propaganda but the USSR has not yet advanced such a proposal on an official level.

c. CHINA. Despite some reports that the Chinese Communists may be planning late summer operations against Formosa, military information from South China does not indicate that any significant preparations for such action are under way. Reports of the past four weeks have indicated a continual flow of materiel into South China, however, and a Chinese statement for the first time has linked the donation campaign for the purchase of military equipment with the "liberation of Formosa" as well as the Korean war. There are also continuing reports of an increase in Chinese Communist Air Force training activity in South and Central China.

d. INDOCHINA. A report of last week that two Viet Minh divisions had moved into northern Annam from Tonkin now appears to have been erroneous. An increase in Viet Minh activity in northern Annam is nevertheless to be expected, after the anticipated rearmament of regular Viet Minh regiments in that area.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/08/23 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000400230012-1

25X1

[REDACTED]

Rumors that preparations are under way for a massive invasion of Indochina by the CCF appear to have been primarily inspired by the Korean cease-fire negotiations. There continues, meanwhile, to be a wide divergence of opinion regarding the number of Chinese Communists now operating in Indochina. The U.S. Military Attache in Saigon believes that there may be from 4500 to 12,000 advisers but that it is practically impossible to compute the numbers serving in disguise with the Viet Minh. Although CCF units could be infiltrated into Tonkin without immediate discovery, it is unlikely that they could long remain undetected.

2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. GERMANY-AUSTRIA.

- (1) Soviet Ground Forces. Soviet field training in Germany continues on essentially the same pattern as in 1950. No large-scale maneuvers or any important changes in the disposition of Soviet forces are reported. Four divisions, including the two tank divisions previously reported, remain in the Letzlinger-Heide training area. As of the third week of June, small elements of at least eight divisions were reportedly in this area, but the bulk of these divisions were reliably reported training elsewhere, and there is no indication that the assembly of odd elements of these divisions in Letzlinger-Heide is for other than training purposes.
- [REDACTED]

25X1

- (2) Troop Movements. Although it is too early to assess the overall effect of annual class inductions on Soviet troop strength in Germany, observed troop movements during the

TOP SECRET

sixty-day period ending 29 June indicate that 81,000 have arrived in the Soviet Zone and that 31,000 have departed. There is some indication, as yet not confirmed, that in addition to members of the recently conscripted class of 1931 incoming movement may have included units or cadres for the activation of new units. The arrival of five trains carrying both troops and equipment, including AA guns and tanks, has been reported. In Austria the last shipment of Soviet recruits scheduled for Austria and Hungary reportedly arrived at the Wilfleinsdorf reception center on 30 June. Total arrivals over a 30-day period aggregated approximately 10,000, of which about 40% were assigned to garrisons in Hungary and the remainder to Austria. The discharge of the 1927 class, already under way in Germany, has not been reliably reported in Austria but several secondary sources claim that such discharge shipments will begin during July.

- (5) Rail Preparations for World Youth Festival. Information available to U.S. agencies in Germany provides no indication that transportation plans for the World Youth Festival to be held in Berlin during August are a cover for a possible troop movement. Rail assembly points throughout Germany, for the planned movement of over 1,000,000 delegates, show the same general pattern as for the Whitsuntide Festival last year, with Berlin as the converging point. There is no evidence that any of the Railroad Directorates in the Soviet Zone have been alerted to assemble their heavy rolling stock or reserve locomotives, or that the head railroad office for the Zone has received any instructions to order such an assembly of stock as would be required for an extensive movement of troops and military equipment.

b. SATELLITES.

- (1) Rumanian and Polish Air Forces. There are continuing indications of increased Soviet willingness to provide jet aircraft, including the MIG-15, to certain of the European Satellites. In Poland, 7 MIG-15 fighter and trainer aircraft (as well as 20 Type 28 jet fighters) bearing Polish Air Force markings were observed on 7 July at Warsaw/Baranowo Airfield, the first reliable indication that this first-line jet has been assigned to the Polish Air Force. Meanwhile, reports continue to point to the further movement of Soviet jets into Rumania and to the training of Rumanian Air Force personnel in jet fighters. Reports of varying reliability have continued to refer to new airfield construction in Rumania at various locations, including Pitesti, Bucharest and the Constanta area, strengthening previous indications of construction

or improvements at no less than 18 installations in Rumania.

- (2) Expansion of Satellite Armies. There is evidence of accelerated call-ups in both the Czechoslovakian and Rumanian Armies. As it now appears certain that the usual autumn call-up in Czechoslovakia was advanced to this spring, the estimated strength of the Czech Army has been increased from 135,000 to 155,000, with part or all of four age groups now in service. The advance in call-up of the new (1930) conscript class may be designed in part to lower the conscription age to 19 or 20 in accordance with the Defense Law of 1949. In Rumania, [redacted] the remainder of the 1931 class in Constanta was inducted in April, while in two other cities the class of 1932 was either called to active duty or ordered to report for medical examinations in early spring. The call-up of the 1932 class, if confirmed, would indicate the simultaneous conscription of the 1931 and 1932 classes. In addition, some Rumanian reserve officers previously considered unreliable were reportedly recalled to active duty during May along with a limited number of reservist soldiers up to age 35. The officer recall would not be unusual and probably was accomplished to permit training in Soviet weapons. In estimates submitted recently by the U.S. Army Attaches in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania on the status of the armies of these Satellites, the following characteristics in common were noted: (a) Sovietization of equipment and tactical doctrine is being carried out; (b) the three countries are in the process of expanding, or are planning to increase, their army strength; (c) all three Satellites need logistical support from the USSR to obtain maximum efficiency; and (d) the armies of the three are steadily approaching a state of readiness for offensive operations.

- (3) Evacuation of Rumanian Border. Evacuations along the Western Rumanian frontier with Yugoslavia apparently continue, with some reports characterizing the evacuation as partial and others as complete. Initial evacuees were minority groups and dissident peasants, but according to one unconfirmed report Rumanians have been warned that they will be moved after minority groups are resettled. In addition, refugees have reported that foreign nationals in Bucharest have been notified to prepare to return to their own countries on 5 to 10 days' notice. In the absence of any reliable evidence of unusual troop movements or of civil defense preparations in the border area, Western observers adhere to their original belief that the evacuation program represents a long-term security measure.

TOP SECRET

c. **IRAN.** There are no firm indications to date of any reaction by Soviet ground forces to the current Anglo-Iranian oil dispute. Reports that Soviet troops along the Soviet-Iranian border have been reinforced have not been substantiated, and one report identifying a new Soviet division in the area is believed to have been inspired by Soviet sources.

25X1

Internally, the Communist Tudeh Party is becoming increasingly active, with recent demonstrations attributed to them both in Tehran and Tabriz.

3. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.

AIR FORCE DISPLAY IN MOSCOW. The 8 July Air Show in Moscow, demonstrating a total of 490 aircraft, was notable for the variety of aircraft types displayed, including helicopters, liaison aircraft, an amphibian, a twin-engine flying boat, a TU-70 transport modified for parachute operations, and a possible new heavy bomber. The demonstration included six confirmed new types of aircraft, five probable new types and two modifications. Although the Soviets appear to have adopted the MIG-15 as their standard jet fighter-interceptor (at least for the present) their continuing efforts to develop more advanced jet types were revealed when prototypes of four new jet fighters were demonstrated. Three of the four were swept-wing types similar to the Types 18, 19 and 21 displayed in the 1949 Air Show and could be further developments of these aircraft. An indication of further development of long-range bomber aircraft was the appearance of a new four-engine bomber, approximately one-third larger than the TU-4, with tractor propellers. This new type aircraft is tentatively considered to be a heavy bomber. The observation of 9 grey twin-jet aircraft suggests that some units of the Soviet Navy are receiving jet aircraft. Over all, the Air Show indicated that the Soviets are making further progress in aircraft development, that they are developing a variety of types of aircraft and that attention possibly is being given to development of jet aircraft for the Naval Air Fleet.

John W. Kasling
JOHN WICKERLING
Brigadier General, GSC
Chairman, Watch Committee

TOP SECRET

Present:

Department of State:

Mr. B. H. Klosson

Mr. W. M. Marvel

Central Intelligence Agency:

25X1A

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

Brig Gen John Weckerling

Col E. F. Adams

Col J. E. Baker

Col R. G. Duff

Col H. H. Smith

Lt Col J. P. Merrill

Lt Col J. T. Mozley

Capt C. C. Quigley

Capt E. H. Walworth

Capt L. D. Wooster

Miss Cynthia Grabe

Mrs Keatts Twyford

Mr H. E. Barkey

Mr Samuel McKee

Mr R. P. McNair

Office of Naval Intelligence:

Cdr S. C. Loomis

Cdr F. Welden

LCdr J. P. English

Mr G. E. Kidd

Mr S. G. Smiley

Directorate of Intelligence, USAF:

Col R. L. Goerder

Col H. D. Neely

Col E. F. Williams

Cdr J. R. Reedy

Lt Col E. J. Sauer

Atomic Energy Commission: Mr M. C. Henderson

Joint Intelligence Group, JCS: Col F. P. Munson

AFSA: LCdr C. Himsen

Federal Bureau of Investigation: Mr M. W. Kuhnitz

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Distribution:

Brig Gen F. W. Roberts, Military Advisor to Sp Asst to President
Department of State, Attn: Sp Assistant for Intelligence
Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Secretary, OSD
Director of Naval Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, USAF
Joint Intelligence Group, JCS
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Civil Defense Liaison, OSD
Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project

Coordinated by Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, DA
Exts 55245 and 72591

Department of the Army Distribution:

Office, Secretary of the Army
Assistant Secretary of the Army (GM)
Chief of Staff
Secretary, General Staff
Comptroller of the Army
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, DA
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, DA
Chief, P & G Off., G-2, DA
SHAPE, Attn: Senior U.S. Army G-2 Representative
CINCPA, Attn: AC/S, G-2
CINCEUR, Attn: Director of Intelligence
Commander, Iceland Defense Force, Attn: AC/S, G-2
CINCARIB, Attn: Director of Intelligence
CINCPAC, Attn: Director of Intelligence
COMUSMACV, Attn: AC/S, G-2
COMUSARAF, Attn: AC/S, G-2
COMUSARAF, Attn: AC/S, G-2
COMUSARPAC, Attn: AC/S, G-2
CG, FRUST, Trieste

Chief, Army Field Forces, Attn: AC/S, G-2
CG, First Army, Attn: AC/S, G-2
CG, Second Army, Attn: AC/S, G-2
CG, Third Army, Attn: AC/S, G-2
CG, Fourth Army, Attn: AC/S, G-2
CG, Fifth Army, Attn: AC/S, G-2
CG, Sixth Army, Attn: AC/S, G-2
CG, Seventh Army, Attn: AC/S, G-2
CG, Army Antiaircraft Command, Ent Air Force Base
CG, Eastern Army Antiaircraft Command, Stewart Air Force Base
CG, Western Army Antiaircraft Command, Hamilton Air Force Base

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1C